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Abstract
In bandwidth allocation games (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different
resources. The player’s utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied.
Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between
the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure
Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor α through
unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold αδ (where δ is a parameter that limits the demand of
each player on a specific resource) such that α-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for α ≥ αδ,
but not for α < αδ. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold αδ and show that the
corresponding decision problem is NP-hard. We also show that the α-approximate price of anarchy for
BAGs is α+ 1. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from
each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus
also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader
class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social
welfare is close to the optimum.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, as cloud computing and other data intensive applications such as video streaming gain more and
more importance, the amount of data processed in networks and compute centers is growing. Moore’s law
for data traffic [16] states that the overall data traffic doubles each year. This yields unique challenges for
resource management, particularly bandwidth allocation. As technology cannot follow up with the data
increase, bandwidth constraints are often a bottleneck of current systems.
In our paper, we cope with the problem that service providers often cannot satisfy the needs of all
customers. That is, the overall size of connections between the provider and all customers exceeds the amount
of data that the provider can process. By allowing different link sizes in network structures, connections
between providers and customers with different capacities can be modeled. In case a provider cannot fulfill
the requirements of all customers, the available bandwidth needs to be split. This results in customers not
being supplied with their full capacity. In video streaming, for example, this may lead to a lower quality
stream for certain customers. In our setting, we assume that each customer can choose the service providers
she wants to use herself. While this aspect has recently been studied from the compute center’s point of
view [9], our work considers limited resources from the customers’ point of view.
We study this scenario in a game theoretic setting called bandwidth allocation games. Here, we are
interested in the effects of rational decision making by individuals. In our context, the customers act as
the players. In contrast, we view the service providers as resources with a limited capacity. Each possible
∗This work was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the Collaborative Research Centre
“On-The-Fly Computing” (SFB 901) and by the EU within FET project MULTIPLEX under contract no. 317532.
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distribution of a player among the resources (which we view as network entrance points) is regarded as one
of her strategies. Now, each player strives to maximize the overall amount of bandwidth that is supplied to
her. Our main interest lies in states in which no customer wants to deviate from her current strategy, as this
would yield no or only a marginal benefit under the given situation. These states are called (approximate)
pure Nash equilibria. Instead of a global instance enforcing such stable states, they occur as the result of
player-induced dynamics. At every point in time, exactly one player changes her strategy such that the
amount of received bandwidth is maximized, assuming the strategies of the other players are fixed. We show
that if we allow only changes which increase the received bandwidth by some constant factor, this indeed
leads to stable states. We further analyze the quality of such states in regard to the total bandwidth received
by all players and compare it to the state which maximizes this global payoff.
Related Work. Bandwidth allocation games can be considered to be a generalization of market sharing
games [21], in which players choose a set of market in which they offer a service. Each market has a fixed
cost and each player a budget. The set of markets a player can service is thus determined by a knapsack
constraint. The utility of a player is the sum of utilities that she receives from each market that she services.
Each market has a fixed total profit or utility that is evenly distributed among the players that service the
market.
The utility functions of bandwidth allocation games are more general. In particular the influence of a
player on the utility share others players receive is not uniform. Players with high demand have a much
stronger influence on the bandwidth other players receive than player with small demands. This feature can
also be found in demanded congestion games [27]. Players in a congestion game choose among subsets of
resources while trying to minimize costs. The cost of a player is sum of the costs of the resources. In the
undemanded version which was introduced by Rosenthal [29] the cost of each resource depends only on the
number of players using that resource. In the demanded version each player has a demand and the cost of a
resource is a function of the sum of demands of the players using the resource. In both model the cost caused
by a resource is identical for each player that uses the resource. In the variant of player-specific congestion
games, each player has her own set of cost functions [27] for each resource that map from the number of
players using a resource to the cost incurred to that specific player Mavronicolas et al. [26] combined these
two variations into demanded congestion games with player-specific constants, in which the cost functions
are based on abelian group operations. Harks and Klimm [24] introduced a model in which each player not
only picks a subset of resources, but also her single demand on them. A higher demand equals a higher
utility for each player, but also increases the congestion at the chosen resources. The final payoff results
from the difference between utility and congestion.
Both, market sharing games and congestion games always posses pure Nash eqilibria. Moreover they
are potential games [28] which implies that every finite sequence of best response dynamics is guaranteed
to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. demanded congestion games are potential games only if the cost
function are linear or exponential functions [23]. For demanded and player-specific games the existence of
pure Nash equilibria this is guaranteed for the special case in which the strategy spaces of the players for
the bases of a matroid [1].
Fabrikant et al. [19] showed that the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete.
This result implies that the improvement path could be exponentially long. In the case of demanded [18] or
player-specific [2] congestion games it is NP-hard to decide if there exists a pure Nash equilibrium. These
negative computational and existence results lead to the study of α-approximate pure Nash equilibria which
are states in which no player can increases her utility (or decrease her cost) by a factor of more than α. Chien
and Sinclair [13] showed that in symmetric undemanded congestions games and under a mild assumption on
the cost functions every sequence of (1 + ε)-improving steps convergence to (1 + ε)-approximate equilibria in
polynomial time in the number of players and ε−1. This result cannot be generalized to asymmetric games
as Skopalik and Vo¨cking [31] showed that the problem is still PLS-complete. However, for the case of linear
or polynomial cost function Caragiannis et al. presented [10] an algorithm to compute approximate pure
Nash equilibria in polynomial time which was slightly improved in [20].
For demanded congestion games it was shown that α-approximate pure equilibria with small values of
α exist [22] and that they can be computed in polynomial time [11] albeit only for a larger values of α.
Chen and Roughgarden [12] proved the existence of approximate equilibria in network design games with
demanded players. The results have been used by Christodoulou et al. [15] to give tight bounds on the price
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of anarchy and price of stability of approximate pure Nash equilibria in undemanded congestion games.
To quantify the inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes the price of anarchy has been thoroughly analyzed
for exact equilibria for undemanded [3, 14, 30] as well as for demanded congestion games [3, 6, 8, 14].
Christodoulou et al. [15] also investigated the PoA for approximate pure Nash equilibria.
Recent work bounded the convergence time to states with a social welfare close to the optimum rather
than equilibria. The concept of smoothness was first introduced by Roughgarden [30]. Several variants such
as the concept of semi-smoothness [25] followed. Awerbuch et al. [7] proposed β-niceness which was reworked
in [5]. It is the basis of the concept of nice games introduced in [4], which we use in our work.
Our Contribution. We introduce the notion of δ-share bandwidth allocation games (BAGs). The demand
on a resource may not exceed that resource’s capacity by a factor of more than δ. Building on a result from
our previous paper [17], we show that no matter how small we choose δ, these games generally do not have
pure Nash equilibria. We then turn to α-approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve
her utility by a factor of more than α through unilateral strategy changes. We are interested in the threshold
αδ (based on a given δ), such that for all α < αδ, there is a δ-share BAG without an α-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium, and for all α ≥ αδ, every δ-share BAG has an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. By
using a potential function argument, we give both upper and lower bounds for αδ. For a general δ-share
BAG B and α < αlδ, it is NP-complete to decide if B has an α-approximate pure Nash equilibria and NP-hard
to compute it, if available. On the other hand, for α ≥ αuδ and if the difference between the most-profitable
strategies of the players can be bounded by some constant λ, then an (α+ ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium
can be computed efficiently. We give an almost tight bound of α+ 1 for the α-approximate price of anarchy
for BAGs and finally show that utility-maximization games with certain properties converge quickly towards
states with a social welfare close to the optimum. We then adapt this general result to δ-share BAGs.
2 Model and Preliminaries
A bandwidth allocation game (BAG) B is a tuple (N ,R, (br)r∈R, (Si)i∈N ) where the set of players is denoted
by N = {1, . . . , n}, the set of resources by R = {r1, . . . , rm}, the capacity of resource r by br and the strategy
space of player i by Si. Each si ∈ Si has the form (si(r1), . . . , si(rm)) ∈ Rm≥0, with si(rj) ∈ R≥0 being the
demand of si on the resource rj . We say that a strategy si uses a resource rj if si(rj) > 0. S = S1×. . .×Sn is
the set of strategy profiles and ui : S → R≥0 denotes the private utility function player i strives to maximize.
For a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn), let ui,r(s) ∈ R≥0 denote the utility of player i from resource r, which
is defined as
ui,r(s) := min
(
si(r),
br · si(r)∑
j∈N sj(r)
)
.
The total utility of i is then defined as ui(s) :=
∑
r∈R ui,r(s).
Let δ > 0. We call a bandwidth allocation game a δ-share bandwidth allocation game if for every strategy
si and every resource r, the restriction si(r) ≤ δbr holds.
Let s be an arbitrary strategy profile and i ∈ N . We denote with s−i := (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) the
strategy vector of all players except i. For any si ∈ Si, we can extend this to the strategy profile (s−i, si) :=
(s1, . . . , si−1, si, si+1, . . . , sn). We denote with sbi ∈ Si the best response of i to s−i if ui(s−i, sbi ) ≥ ui(s−i, si)
for all si ∈ Si.
Let α ≥ 1 and si a strategy of player i. If there is a strategy s′i ∈ Si with α · ui(s−i, si) < ui(s−i, s′i),
then we call the switch from si to s
′
i an α-move. For α = 1, we simply use the term move. A strategy
profile s is called an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium (α-NE) if α · ui(s) ≥ ui(s−i, s′i) for every i ∈ N
and s′i ∈ Si. For α = 1, s is simply called a pure Nash equilibrium (NE). If a bandwidth allocation game
eventually reaches an (α-approximate) pure Nash equilibrium after a finite number of (α-)moves from any
initial strategy profile s, we say that the game has the finite improvement property.
The social welfare of a strategy profile s is defined as u(s) =
∑
i∈N ui(s). Let opt be the strategy profile
with u(opt) ≥ u(s) for all s ∈ S. If Sα ⊆ S is the set of all α-approximate pure Nash equilibria in a bandwidth
allocation game B, then B’s α-approximate price of anarchy (α-PoA) is the ratio maxs∈Sα u(opt)u(s) . Again, we
simply use the term price of anarchy (PoA) for α = 1.
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Throughout the paper, we are going to use a potential function φ : S → R to analyze the properties of
bandwidth allocation games. Let Tr(s) :=
∑
i∈N si(r) be the total demand on resource r under strategy
profile s. We define φ(s) :=
∑
r∈R φr(s) with
φr(s) :=
{
Tr(s) if Tr(s) ≤ br
br +
∫ Tr(s)
br
br
x dx else
3 Pure Nash Equilibria
The δ-share BAGs in this paper resemble the standard budget games from our previous work [17] in which
δ was unbounded. This allowed arbitrarily large demands for the strategies. In particular, the demand of
a strategy on a resource r could exceed the capacity br. In δ-share BAGs, that demand is restricted to the
interval [0, δbr] for a fixed δ > 0. We now show that our previous result concerning the existence of NE still
holds for any restriction on the demands.
Definition 3.1. Let δ > 0 be arbitrary, but fixed. Choose γ, σ > 0 and n ∈ N0 s.t. γ < δ, σ ≤ δ and
n ·σ+ δ = 1. Let B0 be a δ-share bandwidth allocation game with |N0| = n+2, R0 = {r1, r2, r3, r4} resources
with capacity 1 and the strategy spaces S1 = {s11 = (γ, δ, 0, 0), s21 = (0, 0, δ, γ)}, S2 = {s12 = (δ, 0, γ, 0), s22 =
(0, γ, 0, δ)} and Si = {si = (σ, σ, σ, σ)} for i ∈ {3, . . . , n+ 2}.
The players i ∈ {3, . . . , n+ 2} serve as auxiliary players to reduce the available capacity of the resources.
Each can only play strategy si, so we focus on the two remaining players 1 and 2, which we regard as the
main players of the game. In every strategy profile, one of them has a utility of u := γδ+γ+n·σ + δ while the
other one has a utility of u′ := δδ+γ+n·σ +γ. Assume δ ≤ 1. Since δ+γ+n ·σ > 1, we obtain δ−γδ+γ+n·σ < δ−γ
and therefore u′ < u. Since the player with utility u′ can always change strategy to swap the two utilities,
B0 does not have a pure Nash equilibrium.
For δ > 1, we choose n = 0 and γ > 1. In this case, u = γδ+γ +1 and u
′ = δδ+γ +1 with u < u
′. Again, the
player with the lower utility u can always improve her utility. The game B0 for δ > 1 is shown in Figure 1.
We conclude the following result.
Corollary 3.2. For every δ > 0, there is a δ-share bandwidth allocation game which does not yield a pure
Nash equilibrium.
1s1
1 s2
1
1s1
2 s2
2
1
1
δγ
γ
γ
γ δ
δ
δ
Figure 1: A δ-share bandwidth allocation game without a pure Nash equilibrium for δ > 1. Strategies are
depicted as rectangles, resources as circles with their capacity inside. A link between strategy s and resource
r shows that r is used by s. The demand of s on r is written next to the link.
4 Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
The previous section has shown that we cannot expect any δ-share BAG to have a pure Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, we turn our attention to α-approximate pure Nash equilibria. If α is chosen large enough, any
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strategy profile becomes an α-NE, whereas we know that there may not be an α-NE for α = 1. Hence, there
has to be a threshold αδ for a guaranteed existence of these equilibria in dependency of δ. In this section,
we give both upper and lower bounds on αδ. We start with the upper bound α
u
δ , which we define as follows.
Definition 4.1. Let δ > 0. We define the upper bound αuδ on αδ as
αuδ := w ·
ln(w)− w + δ + 1
δ
with w =
(
−1
2
W−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
))
.
Here, W−1 is the lower branch of the Lambert W function. Table 1 shows a selection of values of αuδ .
Theorem 4.2. Let δ > 0 and B be a δ-share bandwidth allocation game. For α ≥ αuδ , B reaches an
α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium after a finite number of α-moves.
Proof. For this proof, we use the potential function φ introduced in Section 2. We also need some additional
concepts. For a resource r, let φr(s−i) be the potential of r omitting the demand of player i. Now, φi,r(s) :=
φr(s)− φr(s−i) is the part of r’s potential due to strategy si if si is the last strategy to be considered when
evaluating φr (cf. Figure 2). Note that we always have ui,r(s) ≤ φi,r(s). We are going to show that any
strategy change of a player i improving her personal utility by a factor of more than α also results in an
increase of φ if α is chosen accordingly. This implies that the game does not possess any cycles and thus
always reaches an α-NE after finitely many steps (finite improvement property), as the total number of
strategy profiles is finite.
For now, let α ≥ maxi,r
(
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
)
which trivially implies φi,r(s) ≤ α · ui,r(s) ∀ i, r. Assume that under
the strategy profile s, player i changes her strategy from si to s
′
i, increasing her overall utility by a factor of
more than α in the process. We denote the resulting strategy profile by s′. It follows
∆φ = φ(s′)− φ(s) =
∑
r∈R
φi,r(s
′)−
∑
r∈R
φi,r(s) ≥
∑
r∈R
ui,r(s
′)− α ·
∑
r∈R
ui,r(s)
= ui(s
′)− α · ui(s) > α · ui(s)− α · ui(s) = 0
Therefore, the potential φ of B indeed grows with every α-move.
f ( x)= b
x
T r (s)br
1
f (x )=
br
x
f ( x)= b
x
T r (s)br
1
f (x )=
br
x
Figure 2: The left side shows the potential of resource r, divided over the players. Each block represents a
player currently using r. The order of the players does not affect the potential as a whole, but the amount
caused by each individual player. The right side shows how much utility each player initially receives if they
arrive at r according to their order. Therefore, the utility of the last player in the graph is her actual utility
from r under the strategy profile s.
It remains to be shown that αuδ ≥ maxi,r
(
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
)
. For a resource r, define T−i,r(s) := Tr(s) − si(r) as
the total demand on r excluding player i. When the situation is clear from the context, we also write t−i
instead of T−i,r(s). We make a case distinction based on the size of t−i and look at the two cases t−i < br
and t−i ≥ br. We start with the first one. Note that we can assume t−i + si > br, because otherwise the
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ratio between potential and utility of i at r would be 1. The ratio looks as follows:
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
=
br − t−i +
∫ t−i+si
br
br
x dx
br·si
t−i+si
= (t−i + si) ·
br − t−i + br · ln( t−i+sibr )
br · si
First we show that this ratio does not decrease as si grows larger. Its derivative by si is
∂
∂ si
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
=
br(si − t−i)− br · t−i · ln
(
t−i+si
br
)
+ t2−i
b · s2i
The numerator can be bounded below by
br(si − t−i)− br · t−i · ln
(
t−i + si
br
)
+ t2−i
= br(si − t−i)− br · t−i · ln
(
1 +
t−i + si − br
br
)
+ t2−i
≥ br(si − t−i)− br · t−i · t−i + si − br
br
+ t2−i
= br · si − si · t−i = si(br − t−i) ≥ 0
and therefore, the original ratio becomes only worse for bigger values of si. So from now on, we substitute
si by its upper bound δbr. Next we determine the worst-case value for t−i. The derivative by t−i is
∂
∂ t−i
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
=
br · ln
(
t−i+δbr
br
)
+ 2br − 2t−i − δbr
δb2r
We are interested in the zero of this function.
br · ln
(
t−i + δbr
br
)
+ 2br − 2t−i − δbr = 0
⇔ ln
(
t−i + δbr
br
)
= 2
t−i
br
+ δ − 2
⇔ t−i + δbr
br
= e2
t−i
br · eδ−2
⇔ (−2) t−i
br
− 2δ = (−2)e2
t−i
br · eδ−2
⇔
(
−2 t−i
br
− 2δ
)
· e(−2)
t−i
br
−2δ = (−2)e(−δ)−2
⇔ (−2) t−i
br
− 2δ = W−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
)
⇔ t−i =
(
−1
2
)
brW−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
)
− δbr
⇔ t−i = br(w − δ) for w =
(
−1
2
W−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
))
One can show that this function has a zero at t−i = br(w− δ) for w =
(− 12W−1 (−2e(−δ)−2)). W−1 denotes
the lower branch of the Lambert W function, which is used since br < t−i + si = t−i + δbr and therefore the
value W = (−2) t−ibr − 2δ < (−2)
br(1−δ)
br
− 2δ = −2 < −1. Using the obtained values for both si and t−i, the
worst-case ratio between the potential caused at a resource r and the actual utility is
αuδ = w ·
ln(w)− w + δ + 1
δ
for w =
(
−1
2
W−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
))
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δ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
αuδ 1.0485 1.0946 1.1388 1.1816 1.2232 1.2637 1.3033 1.3422 1.3804 1.4181
αlδ 1.0170 1.0335 1.0497 1.0656 1.0811 1.0964 1.1114 1.1261 1.1405 1.1547
Table 1: Upper and lower bounds for αδ derived from δ.
For t−i > br(w− δ), the ratio we seek only becomes smaller as t−i grows. This especially holds for t−i ≥ br,
when the ratio between potential and utility becomes
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
=
∫ t−i+si
t−i
br
x dx
br·si
t−i+si
= (t−i + si)
ln(1 + sit−i )
si
By the same methods used above, one can show that this reaches its maximum for t−i = br and si = δbr,
which yields
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
= (1 + δ)
ln(1 + δ)
δ
≤ αuδ
Therefore, αuδ is indeed the worst-case ratio possible.
Now that we have an upper bound on αδ, we give a lower bound α
l
δ, as well.
Definition 4.3. Let δ > 0. We define the lower bound αlδ on αδ as
αlδ :=
2
√
δ2(δ + 2) + δ − 1
4δ − 1
Again, we list some values for αlδ in Table 1.
Theorem 4.4. Let δ > 0 and α < αlδ. There is a δ-share bandwidth allocation game without an α-
approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We refer to the δ-share BAG from Definition 3.1. If we fix δ, the ratio between u and u′ becomes a
function f in γ.
f(γ) :=
δ + γδ+γ+n·σ
γ + δδ+γ+n·σ
=
γ + δ(δ + γ + n · σ)
δ + γ(δ + γ + n · σ) =
γ + δ(γ + 1)
δ + γ(γ + 1)
Deriving f with respect to γ yields
f ′(γ) =
δ2 − δγ(γ + 2)− γ2
(δ + γ2 + γ)2
= 0 for γ0 =
√
δ3 + 2δ2 − δ
δ + 1
One can check that this is indeed the only local maximum of f for γ > 0.
f(γ0) =
2
√
δ2(δ + 2) + δ − 1
4δ − 1 = α
l
δ
The smaller δ is chosen, the better our result, i.e. the gap between αuδ and α
l
δ becomes smaller and α
u
δ
decreases. While a value of δ = 1 already is a realistic assumption as it states that the demand on a resource
may not exceed its capacity, it also means that one player is able to fully occupy any resource. However, if we
think back to our motivation, it usually takes several thousand clients to exhaust the capacity of a provider.
In this context, αuδ -approximate Nash equilibria are close to the definition of (regular) Nash equilibria. This
can also be seen in Figure 3, where αuδ is plotted for δ ∈ ]0, 1].
Theorem 4.4 states that for α below αlδ, an α-NE cannot be guaranteed in general. The following result
shows that below this lower bound, it is computationally hard to both check for a given δ-share BAG whether
it has such an equilibrium and to compute it.
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Figure 3: Upper bound f(δ) := αuδ of αδ for δ ∈ ]0, 1].
Theorem 4.5. Let δ > 0 and α < αlδ. Computing an α-approximate Nash equilibrium for any δ-share
bandwidth allocation game is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the exact cover by 3-sets problem. Given an instance I = (U ,W) consisting of a set
U with |U| = 3m and a collection of subsets W = W1, . . . ,Wq ⊆ U with |Wk| = 3 for every k, computing
an exact cover of U in which every element is in exactly one subset is NP-hard. For δ > 0, we choose an
instance I with q −m ≥ 1δ . Let u′ := δδ+γ+σ + γ.
From I, we create a BAG B by combining two smaller games B0 and BI . B0 is the BAG from Definition
3.1. We label its two main players as player 1 and 2. BI is constructed from I as follows. Every subset Wi
is represented by a player i+ 2. Every element j ∈ U is represented by a resource rj with capacity brj = 1.
We assume that 2δ exceeds this capacity, i.e. 2δ > 1. Otherwise, we refer to Definition 3.1 and add auxiliary
players with singular strategy spaces to reduce the available capacity of the resources. We also introduce
one additional resource r′ with br′ = (q −m)3αδ + u′α . The strategy space of each player i ∈ {3, . . . , q + 2}
is {s1i , s2i } with
s1i (rj) :=
{
δ if j ∈ Wi−2
0 else
and s2i (r
′) = 3αδ
All other demands are 0.
We combine the two unrelated games BI and B0 into one by creating the union of the corresponding
sets and introducing one additional strategy s32 for the second player from B0. This strategy uses only the
resource r′ with s32(r
′) = u
′
α . For the final result, see Figure 4.
B is indeed a δ-share BAG. For the resource r′, note that both (q−m)3αδ+ u′α ≥ (q−m)3αδ ≥ 3αδ δ = 3α
and (q −m)3αδ + u′α ≥ 3α + u
′
α ≥ 3α + u
′
α ≥ 2δ(1−δ)αδ + u
′
α ≥ u
′(1−δ)
αδ +
u′
α =
u′
αδ , so no demand on r
′ exceeds
δbr′ .
We already know that B0 has no α-NE. Since the second player now has an additional strategy s32, this
strategy has to be part of any α-NE s = (s1, s2, . . . , sq+2) of B. However, if u2,r′(s) < s2(r′), the player will
dismiss this strategy and change back to s12 or s
2
2. Therefore, at most (q−m) players i ∈ {3, . . . , q+ 2} from
BI are allowed to play s2i . Every player i with strategy s1i and utility below 3δ will switch to s2i . Therefore,
exactly m players pick s1i in s and they form an exact cover over the resources r1, . . . , r3m.
The proof also shows that the decision version of this problem is NP-complete. However, for α ≥ αuδ
and if the utilities uopti := maxsi∈Si
∑
r∈Rmin(si(r), br) of the most-profitable strategies of the players do
not differ too much from each other, approximate Nash equilibria can be computed efficiently. For example,
symmetric games always have this property.
We do not impose any restriction on how much the demands of a single player may deviate from another
between her different strategies. However, we can assume that uopti and the potential utility of any other
strategy differ by a factor of at most nδ. Otherwise, that strategy would never be chosen.
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Figure 4: The BAG B, created from B0 and BI .
Lemma 4.6. Let B be a δ-share BAG. Then ui(s) ≥ u
opt
i
(nδ)2 for all players i ∈ N and strategy profile s.
Proof. Let sopti be the strategy of i associated with u
opt
i . First, we show that ui,r(s−i, s
opt
i ) ≥ s
opt
i (r)
nδ
holds for all s−i and r. If Tr(s−i, s
opt
i ) ≤ br, then the claim is true, as ui,r(s−i, sopti ) = sopti (r). For
Tr(s−i, s
opt
i ) > br, ui,r(s−i, s
opt
i ) =
sopti (r)·br
sopti +Tr(s−i)
≥ s
opt
i (r)·br
nδbr
=
sopti (r)
nδ . By summing up over all resources,
we obtain ui(s−i, s
opt
i ) =
∑
r∈R
sopti (r)
nδ ≥
uopti
nδ . So we can assume wlog that for all strategies si ∈ Si,∑
r∈Rmin(si(r), br) ≥ u
opt
i
nδ . Otherwise, the strategy s
opt
i would yield a higher utility in all situations. By
the same arguments made above, this implies ui(s−i, si) ≥ u
opt
i
(nδ)2 .
We further need an additional lemma to bound the potential of a BAG in respect to its social welfare.
Lemma 4.7. For any δ-share BAG and any strategy profile s, (1 + log(nδ)) · u(s) ≥ φ(s).
Proof. Consider a resource r and let ur(s) be the total utility obtained from r by all players, i.e. ur(s) :=∑
i∈N ui,r(s). We show that (1 + log(nδ)) · ur(s) ≥ φr(s), which also proves the lemma. We assume that
Tr(s) ≥ br, otherwise φr(s) = ur(s). So ur(s) = br, while φr(s) = br +
∫ Tr(s)
br
br
x dx = br
(
1 +
∫ Tr(s)
br
1
x dx
)
.
Therefore φr(s)ur(s) = 1 +
∫ Tr(s)
br
1
x dx = 1 + ln(Tr(s))− ln(br) ≤ 1 + ln(nδbr)− ln(br) = 1 + ln(nδ)
Theorem 4.8. Let B be a δ-share BAG for δ ≤ 1, ε > 0 and λ ∈ ]0, 1] such that for all players i, j
uopti ≥ λuoptj . Then B reaches an (αuδ + ε)-approximate NE in O
(
log(n) · n5 · (ελ)−1) (αuδ + ε)-moves.
Proof. Let i be the player performing an (αuδ + ε)-move under the strategy profile s, leading to the strategy
profile s′. We can bound the increase in the potential:
Φ(s′)− Φ(s) ≥ ε · ui(s)
(1)
≥ ε
(nδ)2
· uopti
(2)
≥ ε · λ
n(nδ)2
· u(s)
(3)
≥ ε · λ
n(1 + log(n))(nδ)2
· Φ(s)
Inequalities (1) and (3) follow by Lemma 4.6 and 4.7 respectively while (2) holds due to u(s) =
∑
j∈N uj(s) ≤∑
j∈N u
opt
j ≤ nλuopti . For convenience, we define β := ε·λn(1+log(n))(nδ)2 . Assume that we need t steps to
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increase the potential from Φ(s) to 2Φ(s). Then Φ(s) = 2Φ(s) − Φ(s) ≥ β · t · Φ(s) ⇔ t ≤ β−1. So in order
to double the current potential of B, we need at most β−1 improving moves. Therefore, the game has to
reach a corresponding equilibrium after at most log
(
Φmax
Φmin
)
· β−1 improving moves, with Φmax and Φmin
denoting the maximum and minimum potential of B, respectively. Since Φmax ≤
∑
i∈N u
opt
i due to δ ≤ 1
and Φmin ≥
∑
i∈N
uopti
(nδ)2 , we can bound log
(
Φmax
Φmin
)
≤ (nδ)2.
To conclude this section, we turn towards the quality of α-approximate Nash equilibria. Although no
player has an incentive to change her strategy, the social welfare, which is the total utility of all players
combined, may not be optimal. To express how well Nash equilibria perform in comparison to a globally
determined optimal solution, the price of anarchy has been introduced.
Theorem 4.9. The α-approximate price of anarchy of any δ-share bandwidth allocation game is at most
α+1. For every ε > 0, there is a δ-share bandwidth allocation game with an α-approximate Price of Anarchy
of α+ 1− ε.
Proof. We begin by showing that α + 1 is an upper bound for the α-approximate Price of Anarchy of a
bandwidth allocation game B. For this, we do not need to consider δ. Let s be an α-approximate Nash
equilibrium of B and opt be the strategy profile with the maximum social welfare. We can lower bound the
social welfare of s as follows:∑
i∈N
ui(s) =
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s) ≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s−i, opti) (1)
=α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
(
opti(r),
br · opti(r)
opti(r) +
∑
i′ 6=i si′(r)
)
(2)
≥α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
opti(r), br −∑
i′ 6=i
ui′,r(s)
 (3)
≥α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
ui,r(opt), br −∑
i′ 6=i
ui′,r(s)

≥α−1 ·
∑
r∈R1
∑
i∈N
min
ui,r(opt), br −∑
i′ 6=i
ui′,r(s)

+ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt) (4)
≥α−1 ·
∑
r∈R1
(
br −
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s)
)
+ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)
≥α−1 ·
∑
r∈R1
(∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)−
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s)
)
+ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)
≥α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)− α−1 ·
∑
r∈R1
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s)
≥α−1 ·
∑
i∈N
ui(opt)− α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s)
≥α−1
∑
i∈N
ui(opt)− α−1
∑
i∈N
ui(s) (5)
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Observe that (1) follows from the Nash inequality and (2) from the definition of the utility functions. In
(3), we change how the strategy change from si to opti affects the utility of the players. We assume that the
utilities in s are defined as usual. However, a strategy change by player i does not change the utilities of the
other players (even if they would profit from it). In addition, if the remaining capacity of a resource r is less
than the demand of i in opti, player i receives only the remaining capacity (that is br−
∑
i′ 6=i ui′,r(s)). Note
that within these modified rules, any strategy change by a player i yields at most as much utility as it would
in the regular setting. In (4), we partition R into R1 and R2, where R1 contains all resources for which at
least one player evaluates the min statement to the second expression. Finally (5), bringing −α−1 · u(s) to
the left side of the inequality and multiplying both sides with α yields the upper bound of α+ 1.
sN
2
1
s0
δ
δ
δ
sn1
δ
sn1+1
2α
N
α
N
α
N
α
N
α n2
δ N
sn1+1
1
sn1+2
1
sn1+3
1
sN
1
Figure 5: A δ-share BAG with an α-approximate price of anarchy close to α+ 1.
A lower bound of α is trivial for any kind of game and any value of α. To see that we can come arbitrarily
close to α + 1, consider the BAG B1 defined as follows. Let both δ and α be arbitrary, but fixed. Choose
n1 ∈ N such that δn1 ≥ 1 and n2 ∈ N. N := n1 +n2. Define B1 with |N1| = N , R1 = {r1, r2} with br1 = αn2δN
and br2 = 1 and the strategy spaces Si = {si = (0, δ)} for i ∈ {1, . . . , n1} and Si = {s1i = ( αN , 0), s2i = (0, δ)}
for i ∈ {n1 + 1, . . . , N}. The resulting game is a δ-share BAG and shown in Figure 5. The players 1, . . . , n1
have only one strategy to choose from. Consider the strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn1 , s
2
n1+1, . . . , s
2
N ). The
utility of the players i = n1 + 1, . . . , N is
1
N each. Strategy s
1
i yields a fixed utility of
α
N , so while s is an
α-approximate Nash equilibrium with u(s) = 1, opt = (s1, . . . , sn1 , s
1
n1+1, . . . , s
1
N ) has a social welfare of
1 + n2 · αN . For n2 large enough, this comes close to α+ 1.
Note that Theorem 4.9 even holds for α < αlδ, provided the BAG has an α-NE. This result matches our
previous work [17], where we have shown that the price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria (α = 1) is 2.
5 Approximating the Optimal Social Welfare
In this final section, we look at how fast certain utility-maximization games converge towards socially good
states, i.e. strategy profiles with a social welfare close to u(opt) if the players keep performing α-moves. We
then apply this result to bandwidth allocation games. For this, we use the concept of nice games introduced
in [4]. A utility-maximization game is (λ, µ)-nice if for every strategy profile s, there is a strategy profile s′
with
∑
i∈N ui(s−i, s
′
i) ≥ λ · u(opt)− µ · u(s) for constants λ, µ.
Theorem 5.1. Let B be a utility-maximization game with a potential function φ(s) such that for some
A,B,C ≥ 1, we have that A · φ(s) ≥ u(s) ≥ 1B · φ(s), φ(s−i, sbi )− φ(s) ≥ ui(s−i, sbi )− C · ui(s) and which is
(λ, µ)-nice. Let ρ = λC+µ . Then, for any ε > 0 and any initial strategy profile s
0, the best-response dynamic
reaches a state st with u(st) ≥ ρ(1−ε)AB u(opt) in at most O
(
n
A(C+µ) log
1
ε
)
steps. All future states reached via
best-response dynamics will satisfy this approximation factor as well.
Proof. We adapt a modified version of a proof from [4], in which we do not require an exact potential
function. We assume a specific order in which the players perform their strategy changes. The next player i
is chosen such that she maximizes the term ui(s−i, sbi )−C · ui(s) under the current strategy profile s. Then
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we have
φ(s−i, sbi )− φ(s) ≥ ui(s−i, sbi )− C · ui(s) ≥
1
n
∑
j∈N
uj(s−j , sbj)− C · uj(s)

(1)
≥ 1
n
(λ · u(opt)− (C + µ)u(s)) ≥ 1
n
(λ · u(opt)−A(C + µ)φ(s)) =: f(s)
(1) uses the fact that B is (λ, µ)-nice. With this definition of f(s), we see that
f(s)− f(s−i, sbi ) =
A(C + µ)
n
(
φ(s−i, sbi )− φ(s)
) ≥ A(C + µ)
n
f(s)
and therefore f(s−i, sbi ) ≤
(
1− A(C+µ)n
)
f(s). So if s0 is the initial strategy profile, the best response dynamic
converges towards a strategy profile st with
f(st) ≤
(
1− A(C + µ)
n
)t
f(s0)
By setting t =
⌈
n
A(C+µ) log
1
ε
⌉
and using that
(
1− 1x
)x ≤ 1e , we obtain
f(st) ≤ e(log 1/ε)−1 · f(s0) = ε · f(s0) ≤ ε · λ·u(opt)n . Using these results and the bounds for the potential
function, we obtain
u(st) ≥ 1
B
φ(st) =
n
AB(C + µ)
·
(
λ · u(opt)
n
− f(st)
)
≥ n
AB(C + µ)
(
(1− ε)λ · u(opt)
n
)
≥ ρ(1− ε)
AB
u(opt)
We also see that φ(st) ≥ ρ(1−ε)A u(opt). Since φ grows with every strategy change, this bound also holds for
all following strategy profiles.
When adapting this result for bandwidth allocation games, note that the players have to perform α-moves
when following the best-response dynamic. Otherwise, we cannot guarantee that φ is strictly monotone.
Corollary 5.2. Let B be a δ-share BAG and α ≥ αuδ . For any ε > 0 and any initial strategy profile s0, the
best-response dynamic using only α-moves reaches a state st with u(st) ≥ 1−ε(α2+1)(ln(nδ)+1)u(opt) in at most
O
(
n
α+α−1 log
1
ε
)
steps. All future states reached via best-response dynamics will satisfy this approximation
factor as well.
Proof. First we show that any δ-share BAG is (α−1, α−1)-nice. Let s be an arbitrary strategy profile. We
show that
∑
i∈N ui(s−i, s
b
i ) ≥ α−1 · u(opt)− α−1 · u(s). Note that ui(s−i, sbi ) ≥ ui(s−i, opti) by definition of
sbi . This implies ui(s−i, s
b
i ) ≥ α−1 · ui(s−i, opti) and we can therefore copy the proof of Theorem 4.9 to show
that
∑
i∈N ui(s−i, s
b
i ) ≥ α−1 · u(opt)− α−1 · u(s).
We now use our potential function φ(s), for which we already know that φ(s) ≥ u(s) ≥ 11+ln(nδ)φ(s) (see
Lemma 4.7) and φ(s−i, sbi )− φ(s) ≥ ui(s−i, sbi )− α · ui(s). So we obtain A = 1, B = 1 + ln(nδ) and C = α.
Using these values together with Theorem 5.1 directly leads to our result.
This last result is particular interesting, considering that computing the strategy profile opt is NP-hard.
Prior to this, an approximation algorithm was only known for games in which the strategy spaces consist of
the bases of a matroid over the resources [17]. Following the best-response dynamic, we can now approximate
the optimal solution for arbitrary strategy space structures. While reaching an actual α-approximate NE
by this method may take exponentially long, we obtain an O(α2 log(n))-approximation of the worst-case
equilibrium after a linear number of strategy changes.
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